

Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde? Union strategies towards precarious workers: The case of the temporary sector

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Abstract (200 words)

What determines union strategies towards precarious workers? To address this question, this paper focuses on unions strategies towards the temporary work sector in European countries. By coding various dimensions of collective agreements covering this sector, this paper measures the degree of inclusiveness of union strategies towards temporary workers. Four conditions are tested through Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, allowing for multiple and complex causality. From the insider outsider literature, two conditions are identified: high union density and/or low employment protection legislation. The third condition, bargaining coverage is a proxy for union power resources. Fragmentation of the labour movement represents a fourth condition. Our findings suggest there are two causal paths leading to inclusiveness. Consistent with the insider-outsider literature, the 'Nordic path' shows that the combination of high union density and high bargaining coverage leads to inclusive union strategies. This path explains the occurrence of union inclusiveness in the cases of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Belgium. The second path identifies a 'southern path to inclusiveness' including Spain, Italy and France through the combination of high union fragmentation and high bargaining coverage. Thus, high bargaining coverage proved to be a necessary condition for union inclusiveness in all cases.

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Keywords: Union, temporary workers, labour market, collective bargaining, insider-outsider, revitalisation, Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

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INTRODUCTION

Unions are vital for the protection of workers as they are key actors of the wage bargaining system (e.g.: Calmfors & Driffill, 1988) and fulfil important functions in the administration of welfare policies (Korpi, 1983, 2006). However, the workforce is unevenly represented by unions and some segments such as precarious workers are often excluded (Bernard Ebbinghaus, 2006).

Recently, unions have increasingly turned their attention to precarious workers (Clegg, Graziano, & Van Wijnbergen, 2010). Temporary workers represent one of the main challenges for unions. Their characteristics differ from those of the traditional union membership and they represent a growing segment of the European workforce. Indeed, by 2007, nearly 15% of EU15 employees worked under a temporary contract.³

The extent to which unions have shifted their attention to temporary workers varies across Western European countries, and current theories cannot easily explain the cross national variation towards precarious workers. While the insider-outsider theory (David Rueda, 2007) can make sense of union inclusiveness towards non-standard workers in Scandinavian countries, it does not easily account for union strategies in continental Europe. Similarly, the revitalisation literature can explain some union strategies but many cases do not fit easily in the theory as we will show in further sections (C. Frege & J. Kelly, 2003).

In addition, both theories do not sufficiently consider how the structure of the union movement - such as the degree of fragmentation - affects the degree of inclusiveness of union strategies towards temporary workers. Last but not least, no studies to date have attempted to test systematically the extent to which these theories explain the cross national variation in union inclusiveness towards temporary workers. This paper therefore attempts to uncover the determinants of union strategies.

³ Eurostat data.

The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section (I) maps the various measures of union inclusiveness towards temporary workers and assesses the extent to which existing theories can account for cross-national variation. Section II explains why Fuzzy-sets Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is the appropriate method to address our question. It specifies the selection and calibration of both our outcome set and conditions. Preliminary findings are then presented in section III where several causal paths leading to inclusive union strategies towards temporary workers are identified. The last section concludes and identifies appropriate avenues for further research.

I. UNION STRATEGIES TOWARDS PRECARIOUS WORKERS

This section starts by mapping various dimensions of union strategies towards temporary workers across western European Countries (sub-section 1). It then analyses the extent to which existing theories of union strategies can account for such variation and argues that these theories fall short of providing a systematic explanation for this variation (sub-sections 2 and 3). The last sub-section derives a set of testable hypotheses from existing theories and our proposed additional argument for the previously unexplained part of this variation (sub-section 4).

I.1: Measuring union strategies towards temporary workers

This paper aims to explain the variation in the extent to which national unions are inclusive towards non-standard workers. In the literature, union inclusiveness is usually measured through union density (Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Goebel, & Koos, 2008; David Rueda, 2007). However, the appropriateness of using this indicator should be questioned, as the extent to which unions can bargain wages and working conditions does not only depend on union membership but also on other institutional mechanisms. The so-called “paradox” of France, where union density is the lowest in Western Europe but the bargaining coverage the highest, exemplifies this point. Higher union density does not necessarily lead to higher inclusion of temporary workers in unions, where regular workers may still represent the vast majority of union members.

The recent account by Heery (2009) enriches the concept of union inclusiveness towards non-standard workers. In addition to union density, he takes into account the provisions bargained by the unions for this group of the workforce. Those provisions reflect the aim of the union to achieve equal treatment for those workers, defined as union “inclusion”. They may also serve specific needs of non-standard workers, which arise from their different contract typology (defined as union “engagement”) (Heery, 2009).

Our outcome “union inclusiveness” is therefore constituted by different indicators. First, we consider union density. We rely on the data by Ebbinghaus et al. 2008, which are calculated on the basis of the European Social Survey (wave 2002/2003). Second, we address the bargaining dimension by including the provisions bargained by the unions for a category of workers which has often been considered emblematic for non-standard work such as Temporary Agency Workers (TAWs). Moreover, while the contract typologies of non-standard work vary across countries, TAW is present in all European countries of our analysis and is also subject to similar regulation, given the EU Directive on this issue.

Our choice of indicators relies on Arrowsmith (2009), which wrote a report on TAW for the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) pointing out the main areas of bargaining such as pay, training and social security issues. We then analyzed the EIRO country reports on TAW and looked for information on the following dimensions: equal pay, additional training, indemnity for availability, flexibility bonus, and measures ensuring the transformation of temporary into permanent contracts (“stabilisation”). If the information was missing or seemed contradictory, we considered other data sources (for instance Institut des sciences du travail, 2003; JILPT, 2011) and national Collective Labour Agreements (CLAs).

Table 1 below contains the information relative to union inclusiveness. In the columns regarding the provision for TAWs we specify whether the provisions are set by law or by CLA. This distinction will affect the way in which we calibrate our outcome variable. There are important cross-country differences in unions’ approaches towards precarious

workers. Scandinavian countries score highest with respect to union density of temporary workers, with Belgium and Ireland also achieving high levels on this dimension.

However, agency work has been object of regulation through collective bargaining in most of European countries. Generally, equal pay is the dimension where the vast majority of countries have a CLA. About half of the countries have CLAs containing supplementary training provisions for TAWs. By contrast, only France has a CLA for flexibility bonus and only CLAs in the Netherlands and Italy contains measure for ensuring the transition from an agency contract to a permanent position (“stabilisation”). Last but not least, Sweden, Italy and Austria have undertaken a CLA that grants indemnity for availability, which mean that agency workers get special benefits even if they do not have an assignment at any user firm.

Surprisingly countries such as Spain, Italy and France, where unions have traditionally be seen as exclusionary towards precarious worker, have also undertaken various CLAs. Indeed, France and Italy have among the highest number of dimensions where a CLA exists. We therefore consider two main theories to assess the extent to which they can account for this variation in union strategies towards TAWs.

< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >

I.2: Union preferences: Insider-outsider versus revitalisation

Two main strands of literature analyse union preferences: the revitalisation literature and the insider outsider literature. The revitalization literature studies unions’ reactions to the decline experienced by the labour movement in most of the advanced capitalist economies. One of the main expectations of this literature is that unions can broaden their agenda and their membership to marginal groups of the workforce in order to revitalize their structures (Carola Frege & John Kelly, 2003).

Insider outsider theories start from the premise that one should distinguish between insiders in full time permanent and well protected contracts and those either excluded

from the labour market or in non-standard employment. Where insiders are well protected from becoming unemployed and unions have mostly insiders among their members, unions should not defend the interests of outsiders well. Rueda (2007) identifies two key explanatory variables for our investigation of how insiders' institutions affect labour market outsiders are Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) for regular workers and union density.

EPL for regular workers can be seen as a proxy for the risk of becoming unemployed that insiders face: where it is high insiders will be highly insulated from unemployment and may not favour spending on labour market policies. Note that oddly enough, Rueda (2007) relies on overall employment protection legislation which misconstrues employment protection for outsiders (EPL for temporary workers) and for insiders (EPL for regular workers). Instead, we are going to use a composite measure of EPL which combines EPL for regular workers and collective dismissals provisions (see sub-section E). While EPL was primarily applied to evaluate the incentives that social democrats faced in contexts where most workers were insulated from unemployment risks, the underlying logic can be transposed to unions' incentives. The more protected the insiders in unions, the less they will fear becoming outsiders. In such a context, unions would be less likely to unionise outsiders and to create collective bargaining agreements that cover them.

Similarly, union density is supposed to be a measure of how inclusive unions are. Encompassing unions will more members that are outsiders. This should make it more likely that unions promote outsiders' interests generally and that they would extend collective bargaining agreements to outsiders and temporary workers. Conversely, the revitalisation literature would expect unions with low membership to try to organise new groups of workers in order to increase their power resources. With respect to union density, we have conflicting expectations over union strategies towards temporary workers. How far do the expectations of these two different literature strands conform to the variation presented earlier in table 1?

While the insider-outsider theory is consistent with the patterns observed in Scandinavia, it is more hard pressed to explain other cases. Indeed, Scandinavian countries are characterised by high union density and low employment protection (see Figure 1 and 2). This rightly predicts that their unions should develop inclusive strategies towards temporary workers. On the other hand, France and Spain are characterised by fairly high levels of employment protection and low union density. This is hard to reconcile with the evidence presented in table 1, where one could observe significant attempts at inclusiveness in the form of various forms of collective agreements covering the temporary sector.

<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>

<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>

Considering specific country cases highlights a similar tension between the observable implications of the insider-outsider theory and the observed strategies of unions. For instance, despite the lowest union density in Europe, French unions have adopted an inclusive approach towards precarious workers. They engaged in strikes and campaigns for precarious workers in low wage retail and services sectors⁴ and in the Culture Ministry in 1999.⁵ In Italy, the three main labour movement organisations have founded unions which exclusively represent atypical workers and offer them counselling services.

From this discussion we derive the following two conditions: Employment Protection Legislation and Union density; and specify how we construct them.

Condition 1. Employment Protection Legislation (EPL).

We take EPL as a proxy for insiders' preferences as it protects insiders from the risk of unemployment and from the pressure of an unregulated temporary sector. Thus, we expect a low level of EPL to be a necessary condition or at least part of a sufficient causal path leading to inclusive union strategies towards temporary workers.

⁴ See EIRO: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1999/06/inbrief/fr9906192n.htm>

⁵ See EIRO: <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2002/06/feature/fr0206106f.htm>

Condition 2. High union density (UD).

This is a proxy for encompassing unions: High UD makes it more likely that temporary workers will be unionised. Moreover, it also implies that encompassing unions are more likely to sign collective agreements aiming at improving pay and working conditions for non-standard workers because they have to follow their members' interests.

I.3: Power resource approach

The literature on unions' strategies points out that those tend to be path-dependent. In particular, unions' strategic choice is supposed to be based on the institutional and political resources which are available in the context of the respective national political economies (Baccaro, Hamann, & Turner, 2003; Heery & Adler, 2004). For instance, the level of institutional embeddedness might affect unions' strategies as it partly disentangles unions' bargaining power from the membership size and from members' mobilization. So unions with institutionalized bargaining rights at workplace and sectoral level are less likely to broaden their membership to the margins of the workforce such as temporary workers (Baccaro, et al., 2003; Heery & Adler, 2004). Unions in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) (Hall & Soskice, 2001) are therefore not expected to differ in the extent to which they include temporary workers as they all benefit of encompassing Industrial Relations institutions relative to Liberal Market Economies (LMEs).

Condition 3. Adjusted bargaining coverage (ABC)⁶

This is a proxy for institutional capacity of unions. According to the argument on institutionally embedded unions, high bargaining coverage would lead to unions' exclusive strategies towards temporary workers. However, ABC could also be interpreted as a proxy for union power so, combined with conditions affecting labour preferences, it could also lead unions to bargain inclusive provisions for temporary workers.

⁶ Other proxies were also tried.

I.4: The role of labour structure

In this paper, we introduce a variable into the analysis which has not been taken into sufficient account in the literature: the structure of the labour movement. More specifically, while the fragmentation of the labour movement has been considered in the industrial relations literature, it has so far been mainly neglected in the revitalization literature and in the literature on dualisation. Union fragmentation can foster competition among unions. This can affect union recruiting strategies and push them to recruit and represent groups of the workforce outside the usual recruiting pool such as contingent workers (e.g.: Hassel, 1999, 2007). Indeed, while the insider-outsider framework assigns preferences to unions and their members and the revitalization literature focuses mainly on the political and institutional context, the organizational structure of labour may influence unions' preferences and provide them with different incentives.

By including fragmentation into the analysis we also consider unions' identity as a driver of their strategies (Cornfield, 1993; Hyman, 1996). Unions have developed an identity through their historical interaction with the state and employers. Union identity can orientate towards the following ideal types, which differ in regard to basic assumptions on the meaning of unionism in society: business unionism, class organization and social partner (Hyman 2001). As it is problematic to consider unions' identity as stand-alone variable rather than as dependent on the institutional setting, using fragmentation as a proxy offers the opportunity to derive expectations based on identity about unions' strategies towards outsiders.

Condition 4. High union fragmentation (Effective Fragmentation -EF)

This is a proxy for both competition among unions and ideological differences. High fragmentation is expected to be necessary or be part of a sufficient path leading to union inclusiveness. There can be different mechanisms leading from fragmentation to union inclusiveness. First, unions compete among each other for members which represent one of the main sources of union power (Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980). For this reason, unions have an incentive to engage in organizing temporary workers. To this end, they are also

interested in achieving bargaining provisions showing their commitment to this category of workers.

Second, fragmentation could be considered a proxy for 'working class' ideology of unions. According to Hyman and McCormick⁷, one difference between fragmented and non-fragmented labour movements is the extent to which ideological diversity is internalised in a single movement. This is most apparent in France “where Unions are fragmented along ideological lines”.⁸ As a result, where labour is unitary and its role institutionalized, unions tend to focus on their core membership and are less ideological. By contrast, a fragmented labour landscape presents more left-radical unions, which understand their role as “social movement” or as “class organization”. Labour fragmentation enables them to adopt new positions and strategies such as the inclusion of atypical workers.

Third, union fragmentation could be correlated with a more interventionist role of the state in the labour market which compensate for the weakness of the labour movement. However, we have tried to capture the role of the state when we constructed and calibrated our outcome set. Indeed, we gave lower membership scores for union inclusiveness when equal treatment and other social provisions for temporary workers were set by law (see section II.2 for details).

II. METHOD AND DATA

This section starts by explaining why Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is the appropriate method for our purpose (sub-section 1). It then briefly reviews the data that was used, how our outcome and independent variables were constructed and how we calibrated our variables.

⁷ This point was made by Hyman and McCormick in a Conference on the 8th May 2012 taking place at the European Trade Union Institute, Brussels.

⁸ Page 9, Gumbrell-McCormick, R. and Hyman, R. (2006) Embedded collectivism? Workplace representation in France and Germany. LSE research online.

II.1: The choice of QCA: rationale and method

FsQCA is the appropriate method for our analysis for a number of reasons. First, we have a limited number of cases (14 countries) so this method is more appropriate than standard regression analysis which requires a much larger sample size to draw valid causal inference.

Second, we want to explore how different combinations of factors lead to our outcome, union inclusiveness towards contingent workers. Using more conventional statistical analysis, previous literature (Rueda, 2007) has argued that low employment protection and high union density lead to better representation of outsiders' interests through insiders' institutions. However, this falls short of identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for union inclusiveness, which is analytically distinct from marginal effects. In addition, conventional statistical method cannot investigate the existence of alternative – or indeed multiple - causal paths.

Third, the membership of cases in our outcome set and in most of the explanatory conditions could not be expressed through crisp values making it necessary to rely instead on the fuzzy set. For instance, the extent to which unions are inclusive varies along a continuum and does not easily lend itself to a dichotomous 0 and 1 categorisation.

We ran series of models for examining combinations of the conditions identified in the previous section. As the number of cases we consider is limited, using more than four conditions would increase the risk of logical remainders because the number of combinations of the conditions becomes higher. The number of possible combinations is determined by calculating 2 to the power of the number of conditions. Thus, with four conditions we get 16 possible combinations, meaning that many of those (as cases usually cluster) will not correspond to any empirical observation.

We report in this paper only the model showing relatively high consistency and coverage values. Consistency indicates the extent to which the outcome is explained through the solution set, or, in other words, to what extent the solution set deviates from a perfect

subset relationship with the outcome set. Coverage expresses how much of the outcome is explained by the solution set. These two measures are called “parameters of fit” (Avdagic, 2010; Schneider & Wagemann, forthcoming: chapter 5).

II.2: Selection and calibration of the outcome set

Based on the dimensions of union inclusiveness towards temporary workers presented in table 1, we plan to derive different outcome variables in our analysis. At this preliminary stage, our analysis focuses on our Composite Index of Inclusiveness (CII). This variable is composed of equal pay, provisions for supplementary training and union density. The three indicators should capture each dimension of union inclusiveness. Union density is a proxy for internal representation of temporary workers, while we consider equal pay as proxy of union efforts towards equal treatment and supplementary training as proxy for union engagement. TAWs are supposed to need more training because of the flexible nature of their employment.

Calibration of the outcome variable

For the union density of temporary workers (see table 2), we use the direct method of calibration, which uses a logistic function to fit the raw data in between the three qualitative anchors at 0.95 (full membership), 0.5 (point of indifference) and 0.05 (full non- membership). For identifying the latter three anchors, we use the gaps in the data.

In order to establish the membership threshold (or point of indifference), we calculated the middle value between the union density rates of Netherlands and Austria, where we find one of the biggest gaps in the distribution. The value for the threshold is 21. We decided not to raise the threshold to the other big gap between Belgium and Sweden because a union density rate of 30-40% among temporary workers cannot be considered low (given, for instance, that the union density of the whole French workforce is around 8%). The thresholds for full non-membership is 2.4 and full membership 75.9.

<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>

We included in our outcome set also CLA provisions towards TAWs, and we use the theoretical calibration which is based on logical reasoning, on “generally accepted notions in the social sciences”, and on “the knowledge of the researcher accumulated in a specific field of study or specific cases” (Schneider & Wagemann, forthcoming: 11). We distinguish the provisions along two dimensions:

- 1) The presence and content of the measures bargained, that is, whether they establish equal (or better) treatment for TAWs, whether they set worse conditions for TAWs or do not exist at all; and
- 2) Whether these provisions are set exclusively by CLAs, or set by law and improved/strengthened by CLAs, or whether there is only a law without CLA or whether the CLA worsens the conditions set by law or whether there is neither a law nor a CLA.

While the link between the first dimension and union inclusiveness (our outcome) is straightforward, the second dimension requires further explanation. We decided to introduce the distinction between CLA and legal provisions because we do not have evidence on the influence of unions on legislation so legal equal treatment provisions do not necessarily reflect an inclusive orientation of union. We therefore considered countries without better or equal treatment conditions also set by CLAs as non-member of the set “union inclusiveness”. We tried to position all the possible combinations on a continuum going from exclusiveness to inclusiveness, where 0.5 is the point of indifference. The coding procedure is summarised in Table 3 while the coding results for each country along the dimensions of our outcome set are displayed in Table 4. Once we calibrated the dimensions of union density for temporary workers and CLA provisions, we have aggregated the calibrated values into an index which we call the Composite Index of Inclusiveness (CII), as shown in table 5. This is obtained by calculating the simple average of the calibrated values.

<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>

<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>

<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>

II.3: Selection and calibration of the explanatory conditions

For calibrating our conditions, we use the direct method of calibration. As in the case of our outcome variable, the direct method of calibration is used with interval scale data and it is a semi-automatic procedure relying on a logistic function to fit the raw data in between the three qualitative anchors at 0.95 (full membership), 0.5 (point of indifference) and 0.05 (full non-membership). For identifying the latter, we calculated the gaps in the data and we derive the threshold variable. We calculated the value in the middle of the biggest gap in the data distribution in order to establish the crossover point of indifference. The following paragraphs describe each condition that is used in the QCA.

Condition 1: Low Employment Protection Legislation of regular workers and collective dismissals ($F_{slowcepl}$)

As we use the OECD database, we also rely on the OECD definition for both EPL for regular workers and for collective dismissals. According to the OECD, “individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts: incorporates three aspects of dismissal protection: (i) procedural inconveniences that employers face when starting the dismissal process, such as notification and consultation requirements; (ii) notice periods and severance pay, which typically vary by tenure of the employee; and (iii) difficulty of dismissal, as determined by the circumstances in which it is possible to dismiss workers, as well as the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is found to be unfair.”

The indicator for collective dismissals measures “additional costs and procedures involved in dismissing more than one worker at a time (compared with the cost of individual dismissal)”. Regarding the calibration, the point of indifference is 2.9, the lowest threshold is 1.71 and the highest is at 3.85. The OECD provide four such indexes of EPL: for regular workers, for temporary workers, collective dismissals, and an overall index taking a weighting average of the latter three. More specifically, the overall index is a “weighted sum of sub-indicators for regular employment (weight of 5/12), temporary employment (5/12) and collective dismissals (2/12)” (OECD stats website). Given our

focus is on the protection of regular workers and not temporary workers, we create an alternative composite index of EPL that attributes a weight of one third to collective dismissals and two third to individual dismissal of regular workers. This calculation is shown in table 6.

< TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE >

Condition 2: High Union Density (FsUD)

The definition (as the data) is taken from the one Visser used for his database “net union membership as a proportion wage and salary earners in employment” (Visser, 2011: 18). Regarding the calibration, the point of indifference is 44.5, the lowest threshold is 8.1 and the highest is 80.1

Condition 3: Adjusted bargaining coverage (Fsabc)

The definition is taken by Visser employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees over the total number of dependent workers in employment“ (Visser, 2011: 18). The membership threshold is set at 73, while the low threshold is at 35.1 and the high threshold is 96. The index of adjusted bargaining coverage is taken from Visser’s database with 2000 as the year of reference (Visser, 2011).

Condition 4: Effective Number of Confederation (FsEF)

We take the definition from Visser’s database “ective number of confederations, defined as the inverse of the Herfindahl- index or $1/H$. The Herfindahl (H) index is given by $Hcf = \sum_i n (pi^2)$, where pi is the proportion of total membership organised by the I th confederation and n is the total number of confederations. The effective number of confederations $ENCfs$ is equal to the probability that any two union members are in the same confederation and thus a measure of the degree of fragmentation or unity at the central (political) level ” (Visser, 2011: 16). The membership threshold is set at 3.05, while the low threshold is at 1 and the high threshold is 8.7.

To sum up, we report in Table 7 the fuzzy membership values of both our outcome set (CII) and our conditions (fsUD, fsEF, fsABC and fslowcepl).

< TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE >

III. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

This section presents our preliminary findings running the QCA analysis on our Composite Index of Inclusiveness (CII). Having calibrated our outcome set and conditions– as explained in section III – we presents our findings for the model on our outcome set ‘Composite Index of Union Inclusiveness’⁹ considering the following conditions:

- Low employment protection legislation for regular workers (fslowcepl);
- High union density (fsud);
- High union fragmentation (fsef);
- Adjusted bargaining coverage (fsabc).

III.1: Necessary conditions

We first start by identifying necessary conditions for the presence of our outcome. These are presented in

Table 8. Out of the four conditions, only high bargaining coverage has a consistency score higher than 0.9, suggesting it is the only necessary condition for our outcome to present. Figure 3 plots our outcome set against adjusted bargaining coverage. The position of each observation under the 45 degrees line further confirms that bargaining coverage is a necessary condition for the outcome.

<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE>

<FIGURE 3>

⁹ Note that other models including other variables such as centralisation of wage bargaining were also run but did not yield interesting results so are not reported for reasons of parsimony.

III.2: Truth table

The QCA software analyses all possible combinations of conditions leading to our outcome in the model under consideration. Only combinations with a consistency score of at least 0.9 were considered, which means the combination is almost always sufficient for the outcome to take occur (Avdagic, 2010: 644).

Table 9 shows the truth table that represents an intermediary step in the analysis. Where the number of cases was superior to 0 (as shown in the column labelled ‘number’) and the consistency score was superior to the conventional threshold of 0.9, a 1 was inserted in the ‘cii’ column. Where the number of cases was 0, that is where logical combinations exist but were not present in our data, the following rule was applied: if bargaining coverage was absent, a 0 was inserted in the column ‘cii’; and conversely if it was present and the logical combination seemed theoretically reasonable, a 1 was inserted in the column ‘cii’. Recall this is because high bargaining coverage was identified as a necessary condition in the previous step of the analysis.

<TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE>

III.3: Sufficient conditions and paths

The output of the QCA analysis, given the truth table discussed above, is displayed in Table 10. Five pieces of information are particularly important. First, for each model the first column presents the combination(s) of conditions that explain the outcome; i.e.: our Composite Index of Inclusiveness of unions. Second, the table reports the solution coverage which is a measure of “empirical relevance” - akin to the “ R^2 in regression analysis” (Avdagic, 2010: 645). Third, the consistency measure captures “how well a given solution set explains the outcome in question”. Fourth, ‘raw coverage’ shows how many of the cases are covered by a given causal configuration. Last but not least, unique coverage is a measure of “the proportion of cases explained exclusively by a given causal configuration” (*ibid*: 646).

<TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE>

This model identifies two potential paths to union inclusiveness, as measured by our Composite Index of Inclusiveness. The first path shows that the combination of high union density and high bargaining coverage leads to union inclusiveness. This path explains the occurrence of union inclusiveness in the cases of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Belgium. The high consistency score for this path suggests that it explains the outcome very well while the raw coverage shows that this path explains whether or not unions are inclusive in more than half of the cases. This ‘Nordic path to inclusiveness’ is consistent with the insider-outsider theory, which we had argued earlier could make sense of union inclusiveness in northern countries but not in southern Europe.

The second path identifies a ‘southern path to inclusiveness’ including Spain, Italy and France through the combination of high union fragmentation and high bargaining coverage. This path yields similar consistency and slightly lower raw coverage scores. Thus, these results are consistent with our argument for the surprising union inclusiveness in these countries that was presented in section II.

Taken together, these two causal paths have a high solution consistency and coverage scores which indicates that they account for more than 86% of the cases in our sample. These findings are consistent with the insider-outsider theory concerning the effects of high union density, but suggest that low EPL may not be required for union inclusiveness. In other words, a high exposure of insiders to labour market risks is neither necessary nor sufficient for union inclusiveness towards temporary workers to be observed in European countries. In addition, these results show that union fragmentation may have been an ‘omitted variable’ in previous analyses, given its relevance for the southern path.

Note that not surprisingly high bargaining coverage is present in both paths, which is consistent with our identification of high bargaining coverage as a necessary condition in the first step of the analysis. This shows institutional embeddedness is a crucial

determinant of the ability of unions to undertake inclusive strategies towards temporary workers, consistent with the power resource perspective. This also contrasts with the notion that insiders institutions are detrimental to unions' inclusiveness.

IV. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS

This paper has attempted to make sense of the variation in union inclusiveness of precarious workers in Europe. The focus has been on TAWs as this group is emblematic of precarious workers in Europe. We have developed a measure of union inclusiveness using Collective Bargaining Agreements of the TAWs and combining it with a measure of union density of temporary workers. This resulting composite index displayed interesting cross national variation in union inclusiveness. Existing theories were shown to be unable to fully account for this variation. More specifically, while union inclusiveness in Scandinavian countries could be explained, continental European Countries presented us with a puzzle.

We tested four conditions which we derived from the literature. Two had been explicitly considered in previous empirical studies that looked at labour market policies and workers' preferences towards policies, namely: union density and EPL (Rueda, 2005 and 2007). For the other two conditions we created two appropriate proxies: bargaining coverage as a measure of institutional embeddedness, and union fragmentation as a measure of both competition between unions and ideological differences between them. We argued that one should also take into account union fragmentation as this would increase competition between unions and result in more inclusive strategies towards TAWs.

By carrying out a QCA, we showed that there were indeed two causal paths to inclusiveness: a 'Nordic path' to inclusiveness in line with the insider-outsider theory and a 'Southern path' consistent with our argument about union fragmentation. High bargaining coverage proved to be a necessary condition for union inclusiveness in all cases. This shows institutional embeddedness is a crucial determinant of the ability of

unions to undertake inclusive strategies towards temporary workers, consistent with the power resource perspective. This also contrasts with the notion that insiders institutions are detrimental to unions' inclusiveness.

In future iterations of this research, we would like to further consider alternative dependent variables (testing union density for temporary workers by itself and considering different combinations of collective agreements) and to test additional causal mechanisms for union inclusiveness (e.g.: Ghent System, unemployment, size of the TAW sector).

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Table 1: Mapping union strategies towards temporary workers

	Various dimensions of Collective Agreements covering the temporary work sector					Union inclusiveness
Country	Equal pay	Flexibility bonus	Supplementary training	Stabilisation	Indemnity for availability	Union density of temporary workers
Austria	amended by CLA but principle of favourability applies	no	no	no	By CLA (but ban on dismissal covers only the four days after the end of the assignment).	27.5
Belgium	By law	no	By CLA	no	no	39.3
Denmark	By CLA even if there are sectoral differences	no	By CLA	no	no	75.9
Finland	By CLA	no	no	no	no	67.4
France	By law + CLA	By law + CLA	By CLA	no	no	2.4
Germany	amended by CLA	no	no	no	no	10.65
Greece	By law	no	no	no	no	9.5
Ireland	no	no	no	no	no	37.4
Italy	By law and CLA	no	By CLA	By CLA	By CLA	10.2
Netherlands	By CLA after 26 weeks	no	By CLA	By CLA	no	14.6
Portugal	By law	no	By law	no	no	2
Spain	By law + CLA	no	By CLA	no	no	5.4
Sweden	By CLA but only for blue collars	no	By CLA	no	By CLA	59.8
UK	no	no	no	no	no	9.8

Figure 1: Mean (1985-2006) EPL for regular workers across Europe.




Figure 2: Mean (1985-2006) union density across Europe.




Table 2: Calibrating union density of temporary workers

Countries	UD temporary workers (2002/2003)	Gaps
Portugal	2	0.4 3 4.1 0.3 0.4 0.45 3.95
France	2.4	
Spain	5.4	
Greece	9.5	
UK	9.8	
Italy	10.2	
Germany	10.65	
Netherlands	14.6	
Austria	27.5	12.9
Ireland	37.4	9.9
Belgium	39.3	1.9
Sweden	59.8	20.5
Finland	67.4	7.6
Denmark	75.9	8.5

Table 3: Deriving measures of inclusiveness for different CLAs

Code	Degree of inclusiveness	CLA and/or Law
1	High inclusiveness	Only CLA and equal or better treatment
0.8	Inclusiveness	Law and CLA setting equal or better treatment
0.6 0.6	Partial inclusiveness	CLA setting equal treatment with exceptions
		Law and CLA setting equal treatment with exceptions
0.4	Partial exclusiveness	LAW setting equal or better treatment but no CLA
0.2	Exclusiveness	Law but CLA setting worse conditions for TAWs
0	High exclusiveness	No law, no CLA

Table 4: Calibration of the degree of inclusiveness of Collective Agreements concerning Equal Pay and Supplementary Training

	Calibration	Qualitative category	Source of provisions		Countries
Equal Pay					
	1	High incl	No laws	CLA	FI
	0,8	Incl	laws	CLA	FR, IT, ES
	0,6	Partial incl	no laws	CLA	SE, NTH, DK
	0,4	Partial exclusiveness	law	no CLA	PT, GR, BE
	0,2	Esclusiveness	law	CLA	DE, AT
	0	High excl.	no law	no CLA	UK, IE
Supplementary training					
	1	High incl	No laws	CLA	BE, DK, FR, IT, NTH, ES, SE
	0,4	Partial excl	law	no CLA	PT
	0	High excl.	no law	no CLA	AT, FI, DE, GR, IE, UK

Note: "excl.": Exclusion; "Incl.": inclusion

Table 5: The Composite Index of Inclusiveness

Country	EP	STRA	FSUDTW	CII
Austria	0.2	0	0.59	0.26
Belgium	0.4	1	0.73	0.71
Denmark	0.6	1	0.95	0.85
Finland	1	0	0.93	0.64
France	0.8	1	0.05	0.62
Germany	0.2	0	0.16	0.12
Greece	0.4	0	0.14	0.18
Ireland	0	0	0.71	0.24
Italy	0.8	1	0.15	0.65
Netherlands	0.6	1	0.26	0.62
Portugal	0.4	0.4	0.04	0.28
Spain	0.8	1	0.07	0.62
Sweden	0.6	1	0.89	0.83
UK	0	0	0.14	0.05

Table 6: Deriving our composite EPL

Countries	EPL for regular workers	Collective dismissals	Composite EPL (cepl) = (1/3)*(collective dismissals)+ (2/3)*(EPL regular)
Austria	2,92	3,25	3,03
Belgium	1,73	4,13	2,53
Denmark	1,63	3,88	2,38
Finland	2,31	2,63	2,42
France	2,34	2,13	2,27
Germany	2,68	3,75	3,04
Greece	2,25	3,25	2,58
Ireland	1,60	2,38	1,86
Italy	1,77	4,88	2,81
Netherlands	3,05	3,00	3,03
Portugal	4,33	2,88	3,85
Spain	2,61	3,13	2,78
Sweden	2,86	3,75	3,16
United Kingdom	1,12	2,88	1,71

Table 7: Calibrated dependent variables and conditions

Country	Composite Index of Inclusiveness (CII)	High Union density (fsUD)	Union fragmentation (fsEF)	High bargaining coverage (fsabc)	Low Employment Protection Legislation (fslowcepl)
Austria	0.26	0.34	0.05	0.97	0.4
Belgium	0.71	0.6	0.25	0.95	0.72
Denmark	0.85	0.92	0.2	0.71	0.79
Finland	0.64	0.93	0.37	0.84	0.77
France	0.62	0.05	0.95	0.95	0.83
Germany	0.12	0.16	0.11	0.31	0.39
Greece	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.76	0.69
Ireland	0.24	0.42	0.05	0.2	0.93
Italy	0.65	0.31	0.55	0.71	0.56
Netherlands	0.62	0.14	0.22	0.84	0.4
Portugal	0.28	0.13	0.22	0.44	0.05
Spain	0.62	0.09	0.56	0.71	0.58
Sweden	0.83	0.95	0.31	0.91	0.31
UK	0.05	0.24	0.07	0.05	0.95

Note: EP = Equal Pay; STRA = Supplementary Training; FSUDTW = Union density of temporary workers

Table 8: Necessary conditions for outcome variable Composite index of inclusiveness

Conditions tested:	Consistency	Coverage
High Union fragmentation	0.557721	0.914005
High union density	0.673163	0.822344
Low Composite index of EPL	0.826087	0.658303
High bargaining coverage	0.973013	0.694118

Figure 3: Inclusion and bargaining coverage




Table 9: Truth table

fslowcepl	fsud	fsef	fsabc	number	cii	raw consist.	PRI consist.	product
1	0	1	1	3	1	0.93	0.75	0.70
1	1	0	1	3	1	0.97	0.91	0.89
0	0	0	0	2	0	0.68	0.00	0.00
0	0	0	1	2	0	0.78	0.30	0.23
1	0	0	0	2	0	0.55	0.00	0.00
0	1	0	1	1	1	0.96	0.83	0.79
1	0	0	1	1	0	0.77	0.26	0.20
0	0	1	0	0	0	1.00	-1.#ND00	-1.#ND00
0	0	1	1	0	1	1.00	1.00	1.00
0	1	0	0	0	0	0.98	0.60	0.59
0	1	1	0	0	0	1.00	1.00	1.00
0	1	1	1	0	1	1.00	1.00	1.00
1	0	1	0	0	0	0.99	0.00	0.00
1	1	0	0	0	0	0.82	0.25	0.21
1	1	1	0	0	0	0.99	0.71	0.71
1	1	1	1	0	1	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table 10: Sufficient conditions and paths to the outcome variable ‘composite index of inclusiveness’

	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
High Union density* High bargaining coverage	0.646177	0.305847	0.915074
High union fragmentation*High bargaining coverage	0.557721	0.217391	0.918519
Solution coverage:	0.863568		
Solution consistency:	0.887519		
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term high union density and high bargaining coverage: Sweden (0.91,0.83), Finland (0.84,0.64), Denmark (0.71,0.85), Belgium (0.6,0.71)			
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term high union fragmentation and high bargaining coverage: France (0.95,0.62), Spain (0.56,0.62), Italy (0.55,0.65)			